Publication Date: 3/1/78 Pages: 121 Date Entered: 2/23/84 Title: STANDARD FORMAT AND CONTENT OF SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES (FOR COMMENT) March 1978 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGULATORY GUIDE OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT REGULATORY GUIDE 5.55 STANDARD FORMAT AND CONTENT OF SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES INTRODUCTION The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, which established the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), directed the NRC, among other things, to develop contingency plans ". . . for dealing with threats, thefts, and sabotage relating to special nuclear materials, high-level radioactive wastes and nuclear facilities resulting from all activities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. . . ." The principal requirements for the development of safeguards contingency plans for licensed fuel cycle facilities are found in 10 CFR Part 50, "Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities"; Part 70, "Special Nuclear Materials"; and Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials." Paragraphs 10 CFR 50.34(d) and 10 CFR 70.22(j) identify the requirements for a safeguards contingency plan. Appendix C of 10 CFR Part 73 identifies the criteria to be followed in developing the contingency plan. A licensee safeguards contingency plan is a document that provides guidance to licensee personnel and identifies procedures to accomplish specific, defined objectives in the event of threats, thefts, or sabotage relating to special nuclear material or nuclear facilities. An acceptable safeguards contingency plan must contain (1) a predetermined set of decisions and actions to satisfy stated objectives, (2) an identification of the data, criteria, procedures, and mechanisms necessary to effect efficiently the decisions and actions, and (3) a specification of the individual, group, or organizational entity responsible for each decision and action. A safeguards contingency plan consists of five elements: (1) Background, (2) a Generic Planning Base, (3) a Licensee Planning Base, (4) a Responsibility Matrix, and (5) Procedures. The Background contains the purpose and scope of the plan, describes the environment within which the plan will be put into effect, and defines the terms used. The Generic Planning Base contains a list of events to be planned for and the associated objective to be reached for each event. It may also include for each event an overview of the general types of decisions and actions and other generic information helpful to the licensee in clearly presenting the planned responses to reach the objective. The Licensee Planning Base contains the planning information peculiar to a given licensee including his organizational entities for contingency response tasking, facility descriptions and locations necessary for response planning and coordination, command and control functions, etc. The Responsibility Matrix is a format used to specify the assignment of specific decisions and actions that each organizational entity takes to effect such response. For each organizational entity, the decisions and actions, as assigned in the Responsibility Matrix, are finally summarized in a Procedures Summary for that entity. The Procedures Summaries that result are simplified presentations of the assigned responsibilities for use in training and implementing the plan. The Procedures Summary, although part of the contingency plan, does not have to be submitted to the NRC for approval (see Chapter 5). This regulatory guide prescribes the proposed standard format for the safeguards contingency plan. It also contains an example contingency plan, included as a supplement, to illustrate the guide's application. This guide may be revised to reflect comments received and additional staff review. Purpose and Applicability This standard format and content document has been prepared to aid in ensuring completeness of planning and presentation and to simplify the NRC review of the safeguards contingency plan. It applies to fuel cycle licensees who are subject to the requirements of 10 CFR Section 73.50 and Section 73.60 (proposed 10 CFR Section 73.45 and Section 73.46, see 42 FR 34317, July 5, 1977). This document describes the information required for a plan. Information submitted will be reviewed for completeness on the basis of unique site considerations and the contents of this guide. If an application does not provide a reasonably complete presentation of the required information, final review will be delayed until the needed information is provided. It is anticipated that the safeguards contingency plan will be submitted as an attachment to the physical security plan. To the extent that the topics in the contingency plan are treated in adequate detail in a licensee's approved physical security plan, they may be incorporated by cross reference to the security plan. The applicant or licensee should include additional information as appropriate. It is also the responsibility of the applicant or licensee to be aware of new and revised NRC regulations. Information and procedures delineated in regulatory guides in Division 5, "Materials and Plant Protection," and technical reports and appropriate to certain sections of the physical security plan submitted under Paragraph 50.34(c) of 10 CFR Part 50 or 10 CFR Section 73.50 or Section 73.60 (proposed 10 CFR Section 73.45 and Section 73.46, see 42 FR 34317, July 5, 1977) may be incorporated by reference. The applicant should discuss his plans and programs with the NRC staff before preparing his contingency plan, giving particular emphasis to the depth of information required for this plan. Use of the Standard Format The standard format and content is described in succeeding chapters and is illustrated in the example plan presented in the supplement. If the applicant or licensee chooses to adopt the standard format and content, he should follow the numbering system of this document at least down to the level of subsection (i.e., 3.4.1). Certain subsections may be omitted from an application if they are clearly unnecessary for providing a complete plan or if they are needlessly repetitive. In such cases appropriate adaptation of the standard format to accommodate the particular circumstances is permissible. The applicant or licensee may wish to submit in support of his contingency plan information that is not required by regulations and is not essential to the description of the physical protection program. Such information could include, for example, historical data submitted in demonstration of certain criteria, discussions of alternatives considered, or supplementary data regarding assumed models, data, or calculations. This type of information should be clearly labeled and provided as an attachment to the submittal so that it will not be considered as a license condition. Style and Composition The applicant or licensee should strive for a clear, concise presentation of information that portrays the general perspective and concepts of the basic plan. Details about specific aspects of the plan may be relegated to the appendices to enhance the clarity of the presentation in the basic plan and to facilitate updating and maintenance of the information. Confusing or ambiguous statements and general statements of intent should be avoided. Definitions and abbreviations should be consistent throughout the submittal and should be consistent with generally accepted usage unless otherwise defined in the document. Drawings, diagrams, and tables should be used when information may be presented more adequately or conveniently by such means. In general, these illustrations should be located in the section where they are first referenced. Care should be taken to ensure that all information presented in drawings is legible, that symbols are defined, and that drawings are not reduced to the extent that they cannot be read by unaided normal eyes. A table of contents should be included in each submittal. Physical Specifications of Submittals All materials submitted in a safeguards contingency plan should conform to the following physical dimensions of page size, quality of paper and inks, numbering of pages, etc.: 1. Page Size Text pages: 8-1/2 x 11 inches. Drawings and graphics: 8-1/2 x 11 inches preferred; however, a larger size is acceptable provided the finished copy when folded does not exceed 8-1/2 x 11 inches. 2. Paper Stock and Ink Suitable quality in substance, paper color, and ink density for handling and for microfilming. 3. Page Margins A margin of no less than one inch should be maintained on the top, bottom, and binding side of all pages submitted. 4. Printing Composition: text pages should be single spaced. Type face and style: must be suitable for microfilming. Reproduction: may be mechanically or photographically reproduced. Pages may be printed on both sides with the images printed head to head. 5. Binding Pages should be punched for looseleaf standard 3-hole binder. 6. Page Numbering Pages should be numbered sequentially. 7. Format References In the application, references to this Standard Format should be by chapter and section numbers. Procedures for Updating or Revising Pages The updating or revising of data and text should be on a replacement page basis. The changed or revised portion of each page should be highlighted by a vertical line. The line should be on the margin opposite the binding margin for each line changed or added. All pages submitted to update, revise, or add pages to the plan should show the date of change. The transmittal letter should include an index page listing the pages to be inserted and the pages to be removed. When changes or additions that affect the table of contents are made, pages for a revised table of contents should be provided. Number of Copies The applicant or licensee should (1) submit 6 copies to the Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, or (2) file them in person at the Commission's office at 1717 H Street NW., Washington, D.C., or at 7915 Eastern Avenue, Silver Spring, Maryland. Public Disclosure The NRC has established that safeguards contingency plans contain information of a type specified in 10 CFR Section 2.790(d) and shall be subject to disclosure only in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR Section 9.12. Compatibility The applicant or licensee should ensure that the contingency plan is compatible with the other sections of his application. Reference to sections in the physical security plan may be made in response to information requested by this guide. 1. BACKGROUND 1.1 PERCEIVED DANGER Provide a statement of the perceived danger to the security of licensee personnel and licensee property posed by the possibility of attempts to commit industrial sabotage or to steal strategic special nuclear material. The adversary attributes assumed for safeguards contingency planning stem from those specified by NRC as a basis for current safeguards system design or upgrading. The statement contained in 10 CFR Section 73.55(a) or subsequent Commission statements will suffice. The information is included in the safeguards contingency plan for ready reference and clarity with regard to the adversary capabilities that are assumed to oppose the performance of the primary security mission of the plan. The applicant or licensee should examine his operation to determine its vulnerabilities in light of the threats postulated by the Commission. This examination is to make the applicant or licensee more aware of the total scope of response and will facilitate the generation of events in the Generic Planning Base. 1.2 PURPOSE OF THE PLAN State the general aims and and purposes underlying the implementation of the plan, e.g., general uses intended for the plan, the particular plant site covered, etc. 1.3 SCOPE OF THE PLAN Discuss the scope of the plan by addressing the following information: The general types of contingencies that have been considered, i.e., theft, sabotage, threats. The primary security mission (task to be accomplished) in response to an adversary action and the general operational concepts or approach to performing the mission. The mission statement simply reveals what is to be accomplished and when and why. The operational concept presents an overview of how the mission is to be accomplished. Also, for clarity of intent, the operational concept may indicate explicitly the conditions under which the plan might be executed, e.g., night, day, all weather, natural disasters, fires, site evacuations, etc. Where annotated diagrams or maps of the plant site layout and surrounding areas will be helpful for quickly identifying reference locations, rallying points, movement routes, designated security sectors, etc., they may be included here or referred to if included elsewhere in the plan. 1.4 DEFINITIONS Alphabetically list the terms and the corresponding definitions used in describing the operational and technical aspects of the plan. 2. GENERIC PLANNING BASE Identify those events that signal the beginning or aggravation of a safeguards contingency according to how they are first perceived by the licensee's personnel. A sufficient number of events should be identified to cover the range of possible safeguards contingencies that are envisioned. Generic specification of the events is suggested to limit the number that are required for the plan. Refer to Appendix C of the supplement for examples illustrating the manner of specifying these events. For each event identified, specify the objective to be accomplished by the operational elements when they respond to that particular event. In selecting an objective, consideration should be given to uncertainties about the situation that generally will prevail as of the time the subject events occur. For example, if information available at the time is likely to be so vague that the operational elements will be uncertain whether or not an adversary incursion is in progress, an appropriate objective for the event would involve determining what the actual situation is. Attainment of this objective would in turn clarify the situation and lead to the next event and objective most appropriate for the continued response in order to accomplish the primary security mission reflected in Section 1.3. In addition to the required information above, other information may be included in the generic planning base that is helpful to the licensee (or applicant) in preparing or clearly presenting the general nature of the planned responses to achieve the selected objectives. For example, listing of the categories of actions or the general approach that will be taken by the overall response organization to accomplish a given objective may be helpful in planning, assigning, and subsequent training of personnel in the specific response actions developed in the Responsibility Matrix relating to that objective. Such listing would be tantamount to presenting a limited operational concept that is specifically applicable to the attainment of the particular objective. Another type of information that may be helpful for ready reference is an illustration that shows sequential relationships among all the generic events and objectives utilized for planning. A version of this type of information is shown in Appendix C of the example plan contained in the supplement. 3. LICENSEE PLANNING BASE In successive paragraphs, briefly present information about the licensee's organization, infrastructure, capabilities, constraints, law enforcement assistance, and other considerations that bear upon the execution of the contingency responses of the plan. Only current capabilities should be reflected to ensure realistic prospects for plan execution in the event of a contingency during the current period. If applicable, reference may be made to parts of the physical security plan where pertinent information is adequately presented, rather than repeating the particular information in the safeguards contingency plan. Types of information that should be considered for inclusion in the plan are further described below. Use additional paragraphs as necessary to present other pertinent information. 3.1 LICENSEE'S ORGANIZATION FOR SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY RESPONSE Provide a description of the organization adopted for purposes of planning, assigning, and conducting coordinated safeguards contingency response actions to attain the specified objectives presented in the Generic Planning Base. This task organization should reflect the personnel composing the various operational entities that appear in the Responsibility Matrix and Procedures Summaries; these are the entities tasked in the plan that implement detailed contingency response actions. The minimum composition of each operational entity over a 24-hour manning period should be indicated, as well as any special equipment that would be available with the entity. The designated leader and alternate leader of an operational entity may be identified implicitly by first and second placement on the respective listing or by explicit identification within the listing. Procedures for alerting and marshalling off-duty personnel, as applicable, should also be presented. 3.2 PHYSICAL LAYOUT Operations maps (or appropriate diagrams) showing the layout of the plant and site features and the surrounding local geographic areas may be included here or elsewhere in the plan (e.g., Section 1.3 in connection with the operational concept). If included elsewhere, merely refer to the particular location in this paragraph. The purpose of this type of information is to provide the response forces with an easily referenced graphical display of positional information that will serve as a common reference for rapidly coordinating response operations during execution. In that regard, planned locations (such as alternative rallying points, control and coordination points, law enforcement agency (LEA) locations, movement routes, road block locations, etc.) may be identified by annotated coding on the map. This will facilitate fast and accurate communication of the actual situation and thereby assist coordinating and adjusting response operations as appropriate to the actual situation. 3.3 LAW ENFORCEMENT INTERFACE AND ASSISTANCE Identify each separate law enforcement agency with which arrangements have been made for safegurds emergency assistance. For each agency, state the modes and points of contact, describe the notification procedure, state the expected response in terms of manpower as a function of time, and state the equipment that responding personnel will possess. Describe the general marshalling procedures and channels established for coordination with arriving LEA onsite and while enroute. In addition, describe any additional special capabilities that will be available such as helicopters, offsite roadblocks, hot pursuit arrangements, Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams, hostage negotiation expertise, bomb disposal expertise, and LEA communications facilities that will be used to coordinate response activities. Indicate the principal law enforcement official or agency for requesting and coordinating additional LEA response as required. As applicable, provide similar information on the interface and assistance of bomb disposal units with which direct arrangements have been made. 3.4 POLICY CONSTRAINTS AND ASSUMPTIONS Identify laws and company policies that will substantially constrain or otherwise influence execution of response actions during contingency situations. This may include, but need not be limited to, the following areas as applicable: a. Extent to which local, county, and State law enforcement will be depended on to protect plant properties and employees against adversary intrusion and theft incidents. b. Extent to which company employees will be allowed to perform hazardous physical security duties to accomplish safeguards contingency response actions. c. Extent to which off-duty employees and employee property may be counted upon in response to security contigencies. d. Whether licensee personnel or local LEA are in charge of coordinating overall joint onsite response. e. Role of licensee personnel in local offsite LEA operations. 3.5 CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS Information concerning the planned control arrangements and the use and operation of the various means of communication (licensee and LEA as applicable) during safeguards contingency response operations is included in this section. Emphasis should be on the planned operating procedures that are to apply for coordination of the various operational entities involved. The information on control arrangements should clearly reflect who controls what and when. Also, as applicable, the manner of passing control from one point of leadership to another during progress of a contingency situation should be specific. The leader of any operational entity is presumed to be in control of that entity unless otherwise specified. Primary and alternate locations of key control points and individuals and the manner of announcing the use of an alternate location rather than the primary one are appropriate items to be addressed. With regard to communications, the allocation, control, and usage of the various means of communications should be specific along with any special instructions that apply regarding operation of the equipment. As applicable, the specification and use of various codes or various features of the alarm system for rapid communication of situational information also are appropriate items for this section. 3.6 SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM HARDWARE CONSIDERATIONS Information of operational significance to the utilization of safeguards systems equipment may be included here or elsewhere in the plan, as desired for clarity. For example, the location of available special weapons and protective equipment might be indicated here or in the section on administrative and logistical considerations. Also, information concerning communications equipment might be more appropriately included in the control and communications section than here. Information of interest in this section is the type that is necessary to coordinate commitment or use of the equipment during contingency response operations, e.g., its location if not installed, who obtains it, what operating modes apply and when, the readiness state maintained, etc. Descriptive information on system configuration, technical performance characteristics, and installed locations may be included by reference to appropriate parts of the physical security plan if such information is felt necessary in the interest of clarity. If no information is included in this section, the simple statement, "This section not used," should be inserted. 3.7 ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS Describe any special arrangements and practices that are maintained or implemented to ensure adequate administrative and logistical support during response to safeguards contingency events. The descriptions should include provisions for ensuring that all equipment and expendable supplies needed to effect a successful response to a safeguards contigency will be easily accessible, in good working order, and in sufficient supply. Particular attention should be focused on extra supplies and equipment such as radio batteries, ammunition, special weapons, gas masks, body armor, and helmets that could substantially affect the effectiveness of response personnel. Include also the planned arrangements for provision of necessary emergency services during safeguards contingency operations, such as medical evacuation and treatment of casualties and health physics. In that regard, existing emergency plans and preparations for provision of such services may be applicable, provided they are not dependent upon the availability of personnel who are important or essential to the safeguards contingency response actions. 4. RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX Develop a Responsibility Matrix corresponding to the Generic Planning Base. The tabulations in the Responsibility Matrix should provide an overall picture of the response actions and their interrelationships. The Responsibility Matrix, illustrated below, is an array format to facilitate systematic presentation and crosscheck of the contingency response actions planned for each operational element. The three dimensions depicted are: "Events," "Operational Elements," and "Decisions Actions." Each Event should correspond to one of the contingency events selected in the Generic Planning Base (Chapter 2). The Decisions-Actions for each Event should delineate the decisions and actions and their assignment to the responsible Operational Element (Sections 3.1 and 3.3) so as to gain the objective associated with that Event in the Generic Planning Base. One or more pages may be used to present the contingency actions associated with each event, depending upon the number of operational elements involved in the plan and the amount of column width allocated for each operational element. The matrix format shown in the representative fuel cycle safeguards contingency plan contained in the Supplement has spaces for 10 different operational elements on two pages of presentation for each contigency event; however, more or less may be used as necessary. It may be noted that the example matrix contained in the Supplement also shows the objective associated with each contingency event in two places: the first column and at the top in one other column. This presentation is for ease of reference. The first column permits quick reference during development and maintenance of the plan, and the other column serves to identify the particular operational element which decides when that objective has been attained. Safeguards responsibilities shall be assigned in a manner that precludes conflicts in duties or responsibilities that would prevent the execution of the plan in any safeguards contingency. 5. PROCEDURES SUMMARY Develop a Procedures Summary for each operational element that summarizes the actions from the Responsibility Matrix for assignment to that operational element. The set of Procedures Summaries that results is to aid in the assignment and training of tasks for effective implementation of the plan. The Procedures Summary, although part of the contingency plan, does not have to be submitted to the NRC for approval. It will be prepared and maintained at the licensee's facility and will be inspected by the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement to ensure compliance with the Responsibility Matrix. Each Procedures Summary should provide clear and concise statements of the general responsibilities of the operational element during any safeguards contingency and of the specific actions assigned with respect to the range of contingency events covered in the plan. In that regard show where a task begins and follow its progress through each operational element until the task is completed; i.e., show the actions that each of the operational elements accomplishes to carry out the task. In summarizing actions from the Responsibility Matrix, a given set of summary statements may be used to cover more than one event when the events involved require the same or effectively the same type of actions. Also, where a given action is found to be common procedure for a number of operational elements, regardless of the specific contingency, that action may be included in a summary grouping of standard operating procedures for presentation in each of the Procedures Summaries. Statements of standard operating procedures may also reflect information of general interest to all operational entities, for example, the assignment of overall control responsibilities. Choice of the language used to prepare the Procedures Summaries should take into account on-the-job terminology. To facilitate operations, the licensee may wish to condense key portions of the Procedures Summary to checklist formats according to stages of increased preparedness to respond. For example, events deemed to require a comparable level of preparedness may be grouped under some predetermined alert code, e.g., yellow alert for conditions that are not perceived as imminent but that do require an enhanced state of readiness (some expressed threats, non-threatening civil demonstrations, unresolved perimeter alarms, etc.). When the condition is evaluated and deemed to require an enhanced state of readiness, the alert posture is increased to an appropriate higher level, e.g., orange or red. In effect, the events are grouped in alert categories by their sensitivity and assessed immediacy. To achieve the assigned alert status, checklists are used by each operational element as reminders to perform specifically assigned duties. 1. BACKGROUND 1.1 PERCEIVED DANGER For planning purposes, it is assumed that an adversary incursion against REP Plant could occur at anytime, with little or no prior warning, to steal SNM or to commit industrial sabotage or to seize and hold areas of the plant until stated demands are met. Also, as a hoax or with serious intent, a potential adversary could threaten to steal SNM from or to sabotage the plant. Potential adversaries may be well-trained and dedicated external persons without employee access to REP Plant protected areas or knowledgeable internal persons with the normal REP Plant employee credentials. An external adversary may include one to a small group of armed or unarmed individuals. If the adversary is armed, it is assumed the weapons types could vary from hand guns to shotguns to mixtures of weapons such as automatic rifles and explosives. Tactics employed could vary from those commonly used by criminal elements in armed robberies or extortions to infantry squad-level tactics involving coordinated team movements and use of weapons, as might be employed by well-trained terrorists. External adversaries might also be assisted by an unarmed internal adversary acting in collusion. Internal adversaries are assumed to include unarmed individuals who may be acting in collusion. One of the individuals may have daily authorized access to VAs or the MAA. Attempts at diversion or sabotage may be covertly executed over a period of time. However, one-time attempts might also be undertaken, possibly in conspiracy with an external adversary. Acts of guile and subterfuge may be expected to cover the internal adversary's actions. In general, nonviolent methods may be employed, but unarmed assault upon REP Plant employees might also occur in furtherance of the adversary's mission. 1.2 PURPOSE OF THE PLAN This document presents the safeguards contingency plan of a Representative Plant located on Alpha Site. The plan was prepared to guide and coordinate response actions by employees at Alpha Site against perceived or actual threats or attempts to (1) steal special nuclear material from the Representative Plant or (2) sabotage the plant's facilities. 1.3 SCOPE AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPT OF THE PLAN 1.3.1Types of Contingencies and Responses Considered Responses to deal with and prevent successful execution of threats and attempts of theft of SNM and industrial sabotage are covered in the plan. The plan also includes mechanisms for initiating emergency plans to deal with radiological releases resulting from successful sabotage attempts, but it does not include the emergency plan operations themselves. 1.3.2Operational Concept in Response to an Adversary Incursion The primary security mission at REP Plants is to protect the plant facilities at all times, to prevent the theft or diversion of SNM, and to prevent the sabotage of plant equipment. This mission is performed on a day-to-day basis by the security organization and facilities such as the access and egress control system operating in conjunction with the physical barriers and alarm systems that cover the protected area, the VAs, and the MAA. To deal decisively with an adversary incursion against an REP Plant and thereby accomplish the mission under these extraordinary circumstances, the LLEA emergency response force will be requested immediately upon verification of such an incursion. While the LLEA response is developing, the Alpha Site security force will respond to ascertain and assess the adversary situation and, depending upon the perceived strength and nature of the incursion, to detain, neutralize, or delay the adversary until the LLEA arrives. The Alpha Site security force will endeavor to fulfill the above role by intercepting an external adversary prior to penetration into Buildings 8, 10, or 7 (Figure 1). In the event the external adversary penetrates any of these buildings, and in cases of internal adversaries, the security force will attempt to intercept the adversary within the building or upon exit from the building, again depending upon the adversary's nature and strength. Concurrent with these actions, the security force will maintain a flow of situational information among themselves and REP Plant management to coordinate the onsite response actions, and to the LLEA response force to facilitate their effectiveness upon arrival. As the situation develops, REP Plant security employees will assist in delaying the adversary whenever possible without jeopardizing their personal safety. In this regard, they will lock doors as necessary to secure the MAA and VA, deny information to the adversary, and report adversary and situational circumstances to REP Plant MGMT to assist in illuminating the situation. 1.4 DEFINITIONS Terms and expressions appearing throughout the plan are alphabetically listed and defined below for ease of reference: Term Definition (A) Notation that indicates an action is always taken; the action may be a hedge against uncertainty or necessary in light of the situation. (C) Notation that indicates an action may or may not be taken depending upon obvious circumstances of the situation. CAS Central Alarm Station, Building 10, at Representative Plant. FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation. LEA Law Enforcement Agency. (Due to database constraints, Figure 1 is not included. Please contact LIS to obtain a copy.)LLEA Local Law Enforcement Agency. Local Police Net A mutual assistance police radio net operated by LLEA in the general vicinity of Alpha Site; Alpha Site guard force can enter/monitor this net. MAA Material Access Area. MCA Material Control and Accounting System. NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region ___, Office of Inspection and Enforcement. Off-Dy Guards Guards of the two normally off-duty shifts of the guard force at any given time. REP Plant Representative Plant at Alpha Site. REP Plant ADMIN Representative Plant employee group in the Administrative Area of Building 8, Alpha Site. REP Plant Bldg. 7 Representative Plant employees in Building 7 area, Alpha Site. REP Plant MAA Representative Plant employees in the Material Access Area of Building 8, Alpha Site. REP Plant MGMT Senior onsite manager, REP Plant, with designated staff assistants at any given time. RESPN Team Alpha Site guards and volunteer employees who constitute an armed security response team to assist in safeguard of REP Plant facilities and materials in an emergency. SAS Secondary Alarm Station in Alpha Site Security Office, Building 4. Site MGMT The Alpha Site manager with designated staff assistants at any given time. SNM Special Nuclear Material. Site Radio Comm Net An operational radio net operated at Alpha Site by the site guard force. VA Vital Area. 2. GENERIC PLANNING BASE Alpha Site Operational Elements indicated in Section 3.1 will respond as a team to events that either suggest or reveal an adversary incursion against REP Plant. The types of events experienced and the clarity of the situation at the time will depend on the nature of the incursion, the state to which the situation has progressed, and the amount of interaction that has occurred between the adversary and the operational elements. Therefore, the total response over time is a dynamic process conditioned by the circumstances of the situation as it progresses from start to finish. For planning purposes, a set of 24 events has been selected to cover the range of events that will trigger contingency response actions. For each of these events, an objective has been selected that specifies the main purpose to be accomplished by the operational elements in response to the particular event. In general there are two types of decision/action sequences reflected in these objectives: (1) assessment decision/action sequences to determine the situation and (2) preventive decision/action sequences against perceived attempts to steal or sabotage. Appendix C summarizes the events and the corresponding objectives and codes each combination for ease of reference. 3. LICENSEE PLANNING BASE 3.1 LICENSEE'S ORGANIZATION FOR SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY RESPONSE The following operational elements are the organizational entities at Alpha Site adopted for purposes of assigning and executing security response tasks and procedures identified in this plan. Detailed composition of the operational elements is indicated in Appendix A. Functional Category Operational Elements Security Forces 1. CAS 2. SAS 3. RESPN Team 4. Off-Dy Guards Management 5. Site MGMT 6. REP Plant MGMT REP Plant Operations 7. REP Plant ADMIN 8. REP Plant MAA 9. REP Plant Bldg 7 3.2 PHYSICAL LAYOUT See Figure 1, Subsection 1.3.2. 3.3 LAW ENFORCEMENT INTERFACE ASSISTANCE The following police forces have agreed to respond to Alpha Site's request for emergency law enforcement assistance to deal with adversaries who commit unlawful acts against Alpha Site property and/or employees. Appendix B presents the police response capabilities and the procedure for requesting emergency assistance. Category Force LLEA Red Town Police (Primary Contact) White Town Police Blue Town Police County Iron County Police State Steel State Police In addition to the above area police, the local office of the FBI will provide FBI agents to investigate and deal with Federal crimes committed against REP Plant and to assist the area police as requested. 3.4 POLICY CONSTRAINTS AND ASSUMPTIONS The following company policy constraints and assumptions are reflected in this plan and will influence the conduct of operational activities during execution: a. REP Plant will depend upon local, county, state, and Federal law enforcement agencies to the maximum extent possible to protect Plant properties against adversary incursions and to recover stolen company property. b. The employment of firearms against adversary incursions by Alpha Site employees will be governed by Steel State law. In general, this law permits a private citizen to employ firearms in those circumstances where the citizen has a reasonable belief that it is necessary in self defense or in defense of others when there is an immediate threat of death or grievous bodily injury. c. Company operations to achieve contingency plan objectives will be conducted in a manner that avoids personal injury to company employees and other innocent bystanders. d. Needless destruction or damage to company property and to other private and public properties will be avoided. e. Excepting guards, no company employee can be directed to perform hazardous physical security duties to protect REP Plant; however, company employees who volunteer may perform such duties during emergency situations. f. No company employee is expected to contribute his own personal property or off-duty time to support active contingency plan operations. 3.5 CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS 3.5.1Transition Control Procedure a. REP Plant MGMT will direct the overall response actions of REP Plant in coordination with the Alpha Site Security Supervisor, who will coordinate the overall response of the security force. b. Early security force response actions will be coordinated by the CAS if the response is directed to the REP Plant protected area. The SAS will coordinate the early response if it is directed to other Alpha Site locations. c. During the early response period, the Security Supervisor will coordinate with the CAS and SAS to assume overall control of the security force response as soon as practical during the situation development. d. Early offsite police response will be coordinated by Red Town Police. Initial contacts with Red Town Police will be by the CAS, or alternatively by RESPN Team or CAS in the event such is necessary because of communications problems with the CAS. e. Coordination with the local police response force onsite will be accomplished by way of the Security Supervisor and the Red Town Police. The Red Town Police will continue to coordinate the police response actions onsite. 3.5.2Primary and Alternate Locations a. REP Plant MGMT Primary Locations: REP Plant Administrative Area Building 8 Telephone (400) 374-6300 Ext. 693 Alternate Location: SAS, Site Security Office Building 4 Telephone (400) 374-630) Ext. 211 or Ext. 316 b. Alpha Site Security Supervisor Primary Location: SAS, Site Security Office Building 4 Telephone (400) 374-6300 Ext. 211 or Ext. 316 Alternate Location: CAS Building 10 Telephone (400) 374-6300 Ext. 540 c. Police Coordination Point on Alpha Site Primary Location: SAS, Site Security Office Building 4 Telephone (400) 374-6300 Ext. 211 or ext. 316 Alternate Location: CAS Building 10 Telephone (400) 374-6300 Ext. 540 d. Use of alternate locations in lieu of the primary locations will be reported to and coordinated with the security supervisor. 3.5.3Site Radio Comm Net The Site Radio Comm Net comprises seven stations, six of which are portable. Call designations, initial location of equipment, number of channels, and uses of the stations are indicated below. Unit 100 at the CAS is the base station for net control. Appendix D outlines communications procedures. Station Initial Number of Designation Location Channels Uses Unit 100 CAS 2 Channel 1: Net Base Station (Nonportable) 2: Local Police Net Unit 200 CAS 2 Channel 1: Patrols and RESPN (Portable) Team 2: Local Police Net Unit 300 CAS 2 Channel 1: Patrols and RESP (Portable) Team 2: Local Police Net Unit 400 CAS 2 Channel 1: Utility and Backup (Portable) 2: Local Police Net Unit 500 SAS 2 Channel 1: RESPN Team (Portable) 2: Local Police Net Unit 600 SAS 2 Channel 1: RESPN Team (Portable) 2: Local Police Net Unit 700 SAS 2 Channel 1: SAS (Portable) 2: Local Police Net 3.5.4Local Police Net There are nine stations as indicated below in the local police net, with the net control base station being operated at Blue Town. As indicated in paragraph 3.4.3 above, Channel 2 of the Site Radio Comm Net links with the local police net. Primary points of contact for the Alpha Site Security Force on entering the local police net using Channel 2 are Red Town Base and Car #4. Appendix D outlines the procedure. Station Designation Use Blue Town Base Net Control Base Station and Blue Town Control Car #1 Blue Town Police Response Car #2 Blue Town Police Response Red Town Base Red Town Control Car #3 Red Town Police Response Car #4 Red Town Police Response White Town Base White Town Control Car #5 White Town Police Response Car #6 White Town Police Response 3.5.5Silent Alarms and Intercoms a. Silent alarm from CAS to SAS will be used by CAS to initially request RESPN Team response; followup communications will be via normal telephone channels. b. Intercom within Building 8 will be used by REP Plant MGMT to alert and pass information to REP Plant ADMIN and REP Plant MAA elements. Normal telephone channels to Building 7 will be used in this regard REP Plant Building 7 elements. c. Intercom between CAS and Building 8 will be used for rapid communication of alert and other information in addition to normal telephone channels. 3.6 SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS HARDWARE This paragraph not used. 3.7 ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL PLANNING 3.7.1Radio Batteries Portable radio batteries will be charged continuously when units are not in use. Spare replacement batteries will be available at the CAS and SAS. 3.7.2Arms and Ammunition Extra ammunition for individual weapons will be available at the CAS and the SAS. Additionally, there are six 12-gauge shotguns with ammunition available, two at the CAS and four at the SAS. 3.7.3Emergency Services The manager of health and safety services (Building 6, Telephone (400) 374-6300, Ext 740) will be prepared to furnish health physics, medical evacuation, firefighting, traffic control, and other emergency services in accordance with standard site emergency procedures. Site security forces will not be relied upon in effecting such preparations in order to ensure their availability for conducting safeguards contingency operations. 4. RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX Within the context of the general responsibilities assigned to each operating element, the planning of detailed tasks to support the attainment of the contingency objectives (specified in the Generic Planning Base, Appendix C) has been accomplished through use of the Responsibility Matrix in Appendix E. 5. PROCEDURES SUMMARY To facilitate training and plan implementation, a Procedures Summary for each operating element is contained in Appendix F. These procedures present the general responsibilities of the operating elements, the applicable standard operating procedures, and summaries of the contingency task sequences that are assigned to the elements in the Responsibility Matrix (Appendix E). In the event security contingencies that are not reflected in the contingency task sequences occur, operational elements will coordinate their response in accordance with the general responsibilities and standard operating procedures indicated in the procedures summary so as to accomplish the primary security mission (Subsection 1.3.2). APPENDIX A ALPHA SITE OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS Alpha Site Operational Elements are manned normally as indicated below over a 24-hour period. Guard personnel are assigned to shifts in rotation from the list of Enclosure 1.(*) Enclosure 1 also lists telephone numbers and addresses to expedite off-duty contacts. Enclosure 2 specifies the "chain-alert" procedure for alerting key personnel in the REP Plant security program who are off duty. ENCLOSURE 2 APPENDIX A ALERT PROCEDURE, KEY OFF-DUTY PERSONNEL 1. PURPOSE The purpose of this alert procedure is to quickly and reliably pass alert information to key personnel of the REP Plant security program who are off duty. To accomplish this, alert codes and a chain sequence for communicating the codes will be employed. 2. ALERT CODES Code Meaning GREEN Return to normal state; no alert YELLOW Standby; be prepare to depart immediately for Alpha Site to assist in dealing with an emergency situation. ORANGE Assemble immediately at Alpha Site Security Office to assist in dealing with an emergency situation; arms are not required. RED Assemble immediately at Alpha Site to assist in dealing with an emergency situation; arms are required. 3. CHAIN-ALERT PROCEDURE To rapidly disseminate the above alert codes, alert groups are organized as indicated below. The SAS will trigger the alert procedure for off-duty personnel by contacting the top listed person in each of the off-duty groups, or alternatively the next lower person in the group, and communicate to him the appropriate alert message code, e.g., "This is the SAS; ORANGE alert as of 10:30 p.m." The person contacted by the SAS in each group is responsible for communicating the alert to others of that group and for starting his response to the substance of the alert message within 5 minutes after his receipt of the alert. APPENDIX B LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE 1. POLICE RESPONSE FORCES a. Onsite Response The following listed police capability is planned by the law enforcement agencies indicated for immediate response to emergency requests for police assistance at Alpha Site. The strength of the response will depend upon adversary strength and the circumstances of the particular situation. Force Strength Equipment Red Town Police 2 Officers within Each equipped with White Town Police 5 minutes pistol and shotgun, riot Blue Town Police 4 Officers within control and gas 10 minutes equipment, radio, and police cruiser. Iron County Police 4 Officers within Equipped with pistols, 15 minutes shotguns, and rifles, 2 police cruisers with radios. Steel State Police 4 Officers within Equipped with pistols, 30 minutes automatic rifles, 4 police cruisers with radios. b. Area Response In addition to the above onsite response, county and State police are prepared to cordon off the immediate and general area of Alpha Site if warranted by the situation by establishing road blocks and traffic checkpoints as indicated on the enclosed(*) map. Times required from receipt of request until establishment of the respective operations are indicated below: Operation Time to Set Up Responsibility Road Blocks A,B,C 10 to 15 Minutes Iron County Police Road Block D Within 10 Minutes Iron County Police Traffic Check Points 20 to 30 Minutes Steel State Police 1 through 7 When the traffic checkpoint operations are executed, Steel State Police will place a police helicopter (BAT-4) in operation over the general area of Alpha Site to assist in communications and in chase operations that might ensue. County and State police cruisers will monitor Channel 3 for communications with BAT-4. c. FBI Response FBI agents from Purple City FBI Office will assist local, county, and State police operations where possible and will investigate infractions of Federal law against Alpha Site. ---------- (*) Omitted in this example. ---------- In general, special agents can be active at Alpha Site within 1 to 3 hours after notification of the FBI. Special SWAT Team capabilities and negotiating skills are available with the FBI response if needed. 2. ALPHA SITE INTERFACE WITH POLICE a. Contact Points to Request Police Assistance Red Town Police is the principle point of contact for Alpha Site to obtain and coordinate with police response forces. Requests for police response can be made by telephone or by radio to the following points of contact: Telephone Red Town Chief of Police Telephone Radio (Site Alpha Channel 2) Red Town Base b. Information with Requests When police response is requested, the following information should be provided to the police to the extent that it is known in order that an appropriate response force can be assembled. - Approximate number of adversaries. - Adversary weapon types (i.e., unarmed or armed with pistols, shotguns, rifles, automatic weapons, etc.). - Adversary mood (i.e., peaceful, violent). - Adversary general activity (e.g., breaking into plant, demonstration, etc.). c. Police Force Assembly and Response Based on information furnished by Alpha Site, Red Town Police will request additional police response assistance as needed to deal with the situation on Alpha Site. Police response forces will assemble at Alpha Site without delay, obtain latest information on the situation, and then move to deal with the adversary. Red Town Police will coordinate police response actions onsite. Alpha Site Security Officer will serve as the principal point of contact for coordination between Alpha Site Operational Elements and the police response force. Requests for county and State police action to establish road blocks and traffic checkpoints will be made through Red Town police as indicated above. Information to facilitate identification of adversary, such as number and descriptions of persons and their transportation, license numbers, etc., should be provided with such requests. (Due to database constraints, Appendix C is not included. Please contact LIS to obtain a copy.)APPENDIX D COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES 1. PURPOSE To outline procedures for use of radio equipment by the Alpha Site security force. 2. EQUIPMENT Radio equipment for the security force includes one stationary and 6 portable transmitter-receiver units. Each unit can be operated on one of two possible channels by setting the frequency selector switch to the Channel 1 or Channel 2 position. Channel uses are as follows: Channel 1 - Site Radio Comm Net Channel 2 - Local Police Net 3. SITE RADIO COMM NET a. All units will operate normally in the Site Radio Comm Net - i.e., Channel 1 for coordination and direction of Alpha Site security force operations. Station designations and normal employment are as follows: Station Initial Designation Location Employment Unit 100 CAS Site Radio Comm Net Base Station (Nonportable)Unit 200 CAS Patrols or RESPN Team (Portable)Unit 300 CAS Patrols or RESPN Team (Portable)Unit 400 CAS Utility and Backup (Portable)Unit 500 SAS RESPN Team (Portable)Unit 600 SAS RESPN Team (Portable)Unit 700 SAS SAS (Portable) b. Communication Code Words: Meaning ROGER I have received your transmission OK. WILCO I have received your request, and I will comply with the request. OVER I have finished transmitting and am awaiting your reply. OUT I have finished transmitting this message, and the channel is now free for others to use. REPEAT Repeat your transmission. I did not receive it. REPEAT AFTER Repeat your transmission after the word ; I did not receive it. AFFIRMATIVE The answer to your question is yes. NEGATIVE The answer to your question is no. c. Net Call Sign: ALPHA 6 The net call sign will be used whenever a unit terminates his transmission with "Out", thereby indicating that he has finished use of the Channel at that time, e.g., "This is ALPHA-6 Unit 400; wilco; out." d. Base Station Control: Unit 100 at CAS is the Net Base Station and must be aware of every unit that is active in the net. Therefore, all units will report entry into and departure from the net to the base station, e.g., Unit 300 reports entry: Unit 300: "Unit 100, this is Unit 300; entering net; over." Base: "This is ALPHA-6, Unit 100; Roger; out." Unit 300 reports departure: Unit 300: "Unit 100, this is Unit 300; am switching to Channel 2; over." Base: "This is ALPHA-6, Unit 100; Roger; out." e. Operating Constraints: 1. Units will not use the channel whenever it is being used by other units. Termination of a transmission with "over" indicates the channel is still in use and has not been released for others to use. Termination of a transmission with "out" indicates the channel has been released for others to use. 2. Units will minimize transmission time by shortening conversation exchanges and keeping message content as short as possible consistent with clarity in meaning. 4. LOCAL POLICE NET a. Site Radio Comm Net Units can enter the Local Police Net by switching to Channel 2 and reporting entry to Blue Town Base Station, e.g., "Blue Town Base, this is ALPHA-6, Unit 600; entering Net; over." When Blue Town Base acknowledges the entry, the ALPHA-6 Unit is recognized as active in the net. b. The "ALPHA-6 Unit " designation will always be used to identify an Alpha Site unit that is operating in the Local Police Net. c. Local Police Net station designations and identities are as follows: Station Designation Identification Blue Town Base Net Control Station and Blue Town Police Control. Car #1 Blue Town Police Response Car #2 Red Town Base Red Town Police Control Car #3 Red Town Police Response Car #4 White Town Base White Town Police Control Car #5 White Town Police Response Car #6 d. Site Radio Comm Net units will report departure from the Local Police Net to Blue Town Base. 5. TESTS AND MAINTENANCE a. CAS and SAS will perform a communication check with both channels of each unit that is not in use at least once per shift. b. Portable units will be charged continuously when the units are not in use. APPENDIX E RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX Due to database constraints, Appendix E is not included. Please contact LIS to obtain a copy.)Appendix F PROCEDURES SUMMARY This approach provides a ready reference to specific task sequences for each operating element of the contingency plan. This summary of procedures, responsibilities, and task sequences are given in the nine enclosures as listed below: Enclosure 1. Security Officer's Procedures Summary Enclosure 2. CAS's Procedures Summary Enclosure 3. SAS's Procedures Summary Enclosure 4. RESPN Team's Procedures Summary Enclosure 5. Off-Duty Guards; Procedures Summary Enclosure 6. Site Management's Procedures Summary Enclosure 7. REP Plant MGMT's Procedures Summary Enclosure 8. ADMIN, MAA BLDG 7 Personnel's Procedures Summary Enclosure 9. LEA's Procedure's Summary Enclosure 1 Appendix F SECURITY OFFICER'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY 1. PURPOSE This document summarizes the general responsibilities and contingency task sequences normally accomplished by the Security Officer. The context and background perspective of these duties are presented in the basic plan. 2. SECURITY OFFICER'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES a. Plans, directs, and coordinates the overall task organization, disposition, movements, and response operations of the site security force, i.e., the CAS, SAS, RESPN Team, and Off-Dy Guards. b. Coordinates with REP Plant MGMT and Site MGMT as necessary to enhance security operational readiness and to effectively execute security response operations. c. Requests LEA assistance and coordinates with LEA providing response assistance as necessary to effectively plan and execute security response operations. 3. STANDARD PROCEDURES a. REP Plant MGMT directs the overall response actions of REP Plant personnel in coordination with the Security Officer. b. The Security Officer coordinates with the CAS and the SAS to assume control of security force response operations as soon as practical during the initial response period of a contingency situation. c. The CAS coordinates initial security force response actions directed at the REP Plant's protected area until control is assumed by the Security Officer. d. The SAS coordinates initial security force response actions directed at site locations other than the REP Plant's protected area until control is assumed by the Security Officer. e. Coordination of security force operations with police response force operations will be accomplished through the Security Officer to the senior Red Town Police official present. Red Town Police coordinate overall police response operations. f. The CAS operates continually in the Site Radio Comm Net to serve as the net base station for control of the net. g. Site security force operational elements enter and operate in the Site Radio Comm Net from receipt of a contingency alert until the Security Officer terminates the alert. h. As required by the situation, operational elements alert and pass information to each other by the fastest available means, i.e., radio, telephone, intercom, silent alarms, messenger, voice. i. All operational elements report the situation for purposes of operational coordination by observing and reporting on: * Adversary strength, description, dispositions, and activities. * Onsite dispositions and activity opposing the adversary situation. j. The CAS maintains Building 10 locked and allows no person to pass unless specifically authorized by the REP Plant MGMT or the Security Officer whenever: * An unresolved CAS alarm situation exists. * A threatening situation is perceived to exist, e.g., armed persons or known criminals on site; threatening civil disturbances exist; etc. * An emergency evacuation of plant exists; or a perceived possibility of an internal theft attempt exists. * An adversary penetration of plant is imminent, in progress, or exists. 4. SECURITY OFFICER'S CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES 4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT THE SECURITY OFFICER: * Receives or learns of an explicit threat against the plant, * Infers that a threat exists from a civil disturbance or because of observed anomalies or other suspicious situations at the plant, or * Is informed that a serious threat exists by REP Plant MGMT or other authority, THE SECURITY OFFICER WILL: a. Keep the REP Plant MGMT informed of the threat and all available information concerning the threat. b. Perform onsite investigative effort as indicated by the situation and make offsite queries as requested by REP Plant MGMT to assemble additional information on the threat situation. c. Dispatch RESPN Team observers to scene of civil disturbances or other suspicious activity allegedly threatening the plant to monitor and report information on the seriousness of the perceived threat. d. Advise and assist REP Plant MGMT in assessing the seriousness of the threat. e. If threat is perceived serious by REP Plant MGMT or is reported to be serious by other duly constituted authority, coordinate with REP Plant MGMT and Site MGMT to implement increased security readiness measures appropriate to the perceived threat, e.g., * Increase on-duty guard strength, and issue necessary arms and communication equipment. * Increase number and frequency of security patrols and checks. * Alert LEA response forces as to the seriousness of the perceived threat. * Increase frequency of queries to pertinent LEA or other pertinent agencies for threat status and early warning information and for continued threat assessment. * Place Off-Duty Guards on standby alert. * Review alert procedures and emphasize operational tactics as applicable to the situation. 4.2 IN THE EVENT THAT THE SECURITY OFFICER: * Receives a report from the CAS or SAS, or otherwise learns of a serious imminent or on-going attempt by an adversary to penetrate the plant, or * Learns that an on-going civil disturbance or other suspicious activity is believed to be a serious imminent threat to penetrate the plant, THE SECURITY OFFICER WILL: a. Monitor, assemble, and assess information on the adversary situation and the site security force situation as necessary to adjust, coordinate, and direct the on-going security force response operations to stop or effectively delay the adversary. b. Ensure that LEA assistance is requested and that responding LEA are kept informed of the adversary and security force situation, and recommend avenues of approach to the LEA for their initial contact with the adversary. c. Ensure that Off-Duty Guards are alerted, marshalled, and deployed as appropriate to the situation. d. Establish a joint coordination point on site with the response LEA to enhance communication and to achieve close coordination of security force activity with the LEA response actions. e. Ensure that REP Plant MGMT is kept informed of the adversary and response force situations and recommend dispositions and activity for REP Plant personnel appropriate to the situation. f. If the plant is seized and held hostage, * Assist REP Plant MGMT, Site MGMT, and LEA (as indicated by the situation) to establish communications with the adversary for negotiations. * Recommend LEA dispositions and activity (e.g., road blocks, involvement of other LEA, chase helicopter capability) to prevent adversary escape with SNM and to isolate the plant area. * Dispose the security force to support LEA on site dispositions and activity and to observe and report on the adversary situation. * Recommend to the LEA and to REP Plant MGMT the FBI assistance that should be requested, e.g., - Federal expertise in adversary negotiations, - SWAT team capability, - Federal investigative activity regarding adversary ID and background. g. If adversary penetrates and escapes from the plant, * Ensure that LEA response is immediately informed of the adversary escape situation, i.e., - Egress route and last seen direction of movement, - Transport description and license number, - Number of persons involved and description(s), - Articles carried and their location in the transport. * Request LEA to execute road blocks and hot pursuit operations to apprehend the adversary for recovery of any SNM in his possession. * Coordinate with REP Plant MGMT to assist him (guard interviews, reports, etc.) in determining if SNM has been stolen or if radioactivity has been dispersed. 4.3 IN THE EVENT THAT THE SECURITY OFFICER: * Learns of a possible internal attempt to steal SNM or to sabotage the plant, e.g., - Internal intrusion alarms, door alarms, or MAA portal alarms annunciate, - An emergency evacuation or other type disturbance (fight, irrational behavior, etc.) occurs in the plant, or - An unexpected power outage, communication outage, or other safeguards degrading incident occurs, THE SECURITY OFFICER WILL: a. Coordinate with the CAS, SAS, and RESPN Team to determine the circumstances of the incident and the status and activity of the RESPN Team deployment if any. b. Coordinate with REP Plant MGMT to assist him in assessing the situation and to determine internal security implications and needs. c. Ensure that the RESPN Team and other security elements deployed (including Off-Duty Guards) are adequate to control the situation and to provide required security surveillance of the protected area, as indicated by the situation. d. Monitor the situation; report to REP Plant MGMT the circumstances of attempted hiding or removal of items from the protected area or of suspicious attempts to exist from the protected area. e. Ensure that LEA assistance, as determined in consultation with REP Plant MGMT, is requested to deal with perceived adversaries or other persons involved in the situation. 4.4 IN THE EVENT THE SECURITY OFFICER: * Observes or is informed of physical evidence suggesting that a previously undetected intrusion of the plant might have occurred, e.g., - Hole in the perimeter fence, a plant wall, the roof, - Damaged plant doors or windows, * Is aware of plant damage that results in radioactive contamination external to plant, THE SECURITY OFFICER WILL: a. Assemble information on the location and nature of plant damage and assess the security requirements stemming from such damage. b. Coordinate as required to keep REP Plant MGMT informed of the plant damage and security requirements and to determine the location and extent of existing radiological hazards and restrictions. c. Organize and dispose the security force as necessary to restore or cover degraded plant security protective features and to assist in isolating areas of radiological hazard. d. Keep security force informed of existing radiological hazards and restrictions. e. Recommend to REP Plant MGMT temporary repairs and the priority of permanent repairs to restore the effectiveness of damaged plant security protective features. Enclosure 2 Appendix F CAS'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY 1. PURPOSE This document summarizes the general responsibilities and contingency task sequences normally accomplished by the CAS. The context and background perspective of these duties are presented in the basic plan. 2. CAS'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES CAS will accomplish general responsibilities listed below in coordination with SAS and REP Plant MGMT. SAS will keep the Site Security Officer informed of CAS actions as appropriate to the situation. a. Summon and direct RESPN Team immediately upon sensing the possibility of an adversary incursion in order to assess and deal with the situation. b. Summon police response force to deal with the adversary immediately upon becoming aware of an actual incursion. c. Block unauthorized passage via Building 10 to prevent escape with SNM. d. Prevent adversary penetration of Building 10 to protect the surveillance, communications, and alarm systems. e. Monitor the alarm system, the intercom, the CCTV, and the radio nets to be continually appraised of the situation and to acquire and report information on the adversary and the adversary situation. f. Report to SAS and REP Plant MGMT observed damage or breaches of plant physical security and recommend actions to provide interim security as needed. g. Acquire information on radiological hazard areas, as applicable, from the Security Officer and REP Plant MGMT and keep guard force informed as to the location of such areas. 3. STANDARD PROCEDURES a. REP Plant MGMT directs the overall response actions of REP Plant personnel in coordination with the Security Officer. b. The Security Officer coordinates with the CAS and the SAS to assume control of security force response operations as soon as practical during the initial response period of a contingency situation. c. The CAS coordinates initial security force response actions directed at the REP Plant's protected area until control is assumed by the Security Officer. d. The SAS coordinates initial security force response actions directed at site locations other than the REP Plant's protected area until control is assumed by the Security Officer. e. Coordination of security force operations with police response force operations will be accomplished through the Security Officer to the senior Red Town Police official present. Red Town Police coordinate overall police response operations. f. The CAS operates continually in the Site Radio Comm Net to serve as the net base station for control of the net. g. Site security force operational elements enter and operate in the Site Radio Comm Net from receipt of a contingency alert until the Security Officer terminates the alert. h. As required by the situation, operational elements alert and pass information to each other by the fastest available means, i.e., radio, telephone, intercom, silent alarms, messenger, voice. i. All operational elements report the situation for purposes of operational coordination by observing and reporting on: * Adversary strength, descriptions, dispositions, and activities. * Onsite dispositions and activity opposing the adversary situation. j. The CAS maintains Building 10 locked and allows no person to pass unless specifically authorized by the REP Plant MGMT or the Security Officer whenever: * An unresolved CAS alarm situation exists, * A threatening situation is perceived to exist, e.g., armed persons or known criminals on site, threatening civil disturbances, etc., * An emergency evacuation of plant exists or a perceived possibility of an internal theft attempt exists, * An adversary penetration of plant is imminent, in progress, or exists. 4. CAS'S CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES 4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT THE CAS: * Receives or learns of an explicit threat against the plant, * Infers that a threat exists from a civil disturbance or because of observed anomalies or other suspicious situations, * Is informed that a serious threat exists by REP Plant MGMT or other authority, THE CAS WILL: a. Report all information about the perceived threat without delay to the Security Officer (SAS). b. Perform additional security surveillance at CAS as directed by the Security Officer (SAS). 4.2 IN THE EVENT THAT THE CAS: * Receives an indication of a possible plant penetration such as: - Annunciation of an intrusion alarm, - Extraneous noises occurring in the exclusion area, - Suspicious acts observed in or near the exclusion area, or - Security Officer (SAS) or RESPN Team warning of a dangerous onsite situation, THE CAS WILL: a. Check false alarm possibilities with the CCTV. b. If false alarm is not obvious, summon assistance of the RESPN Team by actuating the "silent" alarm. c. Direct the RESPN Team to the plant security sector of concern; monitor the situation and receive RESPN Team reports over the Site Radio Comm Net. d. Assess the situation to determine if danger of plant penetration exists. e. If danger does exist, protect the CAS against adversary penetration. f. Warn REP Plant MGMT of danger over the intercom system. g. Enter Local Police Net; report situation (adversary strength, weapons, mood, and activity); request police response force assistance. h. Monitor adversary situation and police response force developments over the site and police nets; keep Security Officer (SAS) and REP Plant MGMT informed. i. If plant is penetrated, monitor intercom and the plant alarm systems to acquire and report information on adversary activity within the plant. j. If adversary escapes from plant, request the police to establish offsite road blocks and check points and to execute chase plans as warranted by situation. k. Report observations of adversary escape to the Security Officer, including: - Egress route and last seen direction. - Transport description and license number. - Number of persons involved and descriptions. - Description of articles carried by adversary on departure. - Location of adversary and cargo in the transport. 4.3 IN THE EVENT THAT THE CAS: * Receives an indication of a possible internal attempt to steal SNM or to sabotage the plant, such as: - An internal alarm or an emergency door alarm of the MAA or a VA annunciates, - The SNM or metal detector at entrance to the MAA annunciates, - An emergency evacuation or other type disturbance (fight, irrational behavior, etc.) occurs in the plant, or - An unexpected power or communication outage occurs, THE CAS WILL: a. Check false alarm possibilities, as applicable, via telephone or intercom to plant. b. If false alarm is not obvious, summon assistance of the RESPN Team by actuating the "silent" alarm. c. Prevent unauthorized passage of SNM from the plant via Building 10. d. Direct RESPN Team to the assistance of REP Plant MGMT or to general surveillance of plant's exterior and protected area, as warranted by the situation. e. Observe exclusion area with CCTV and alert RESPN Team regarding location and nature of suspicious activity, such as: - Attempted movement by persons from the protected area to the outside or - Attempted hiding of items or passage of items to outside of perimeter fence. f. Monitor and report situation to Security Officer (SAS) and REP Plant MGMT; recommend additional security precautions as appropriate. g. When authorized by the Security Officer (SAS) or REP Plant MGMT, enter Local Police Net; report nature of situation and @@ assistance at plant. 4.4 IN THE EVENT THAT THE CAS: * Observes or is informed of physical evidence suggesting that a previously undetected intrusion of the plant might have occurred, such as: - A hole in the perimeter fence, a plant wall, the roof - Damaged plant doors or windows, * Is aware of plant damage that results in radioactive contamination external to plant, THE CAS WILL: a. Report location and nature of the damage or physical evidence to the Security Officer (SAS) and REP Plant MGMT and recommend additional security measures as appropriate. b. Obtain locations of radiological hazard areas from Security Officer (SAS) or REP Plant MGMT and keep security force elements informed of such areas as applicable. Enclosure 3 Appendix F SAS'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY 1.0 PURPOSE This document summarizes the general responsibilities and contingency task sequences normally accomplished by the SAS. The context and background perspective of these duties are presented in the basic plan. 2.0 SAS'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES The SAS will accomplish general responsibilities listed below in coordination with CAS and REP Plant MGMT. SAS will keep the Site Security Officer informed of CAS and SAS actions as appropriate to the situation. a. Monitor the on-going situation and be prepared to assume responsibilities of CAS as indicated by the situation. b. Alert and commit RESPN Team, as indicated by the situation, to reinforce CAS or REP Plant security, to monitor or assess onsite security incidents, or to deal with an adversary incursion until effective police arrival. c. Summon and brief LEA response force to deal with adversary incursions against REP Plant or potential adversaries that are onsite. d. Alert, assemble, and commit Off-Duty Guards as indicated by the situation to reinforce CAS or REP Plant security. e. Prevent adversary penetration of SAS area to protect surveillance, communications, and alarm systems. f. Maintain liaison with local police and other security forces, as indicated by the situation, to monitor and assess offsite civil disturbances or other suspicious activity and to obtain early warning of possible incursions against REP Plant. 3.0 STANDARD PROCEDURES a. REP Plant MGMT directs the overall response actions of REP Plant personnel in coordination with the Security Officer. b. The Security Officer coordinates with the CAS and the SAS to assume control of security force response operations as soon as practical during the initial response period of a contingency situation. c. The CAS coordinates initial security force response actions directed at the REP Plant's protected area until control is assumed by the Security Officer. d. The SAS coordinates initial security force response actions directed at site locations other than the REP Plant's protected area until control is assumed by the Security Officer. e. Coordination of Security Force Operations with LEA response force operations will be accomplished through the Security Officer to the senior Red Town Police official present. Red Town Police coordinate overall LEA response operations. f. The CAS operates continually in the Site Radio Comm Net to serve as the net base station for control of the net. g. Site security force operational elements enter and operate in the Site Radio Comm Net from receipt of a contingency alert until the Security Officer terminates the alert. h. As required by the situation, operational elements alert and pass information to each other by the fastest available means, i.e., radio, telephone, intercom, silent alarms, messenger, voice. i. All operational elements report the situation for purposes of operational coordination by observing and reporting on: * Adversary strength, description, disposition, and activities. * Onsite dispositions and activity opposing the adversary situation. j. The CAS maintains Building 10 locked and allows no person to pass unless specifically authorized by the REP Plant MGMT or the Security Officer whenever: * An unresolved CAS alarm situation exists. * A threatening situation is perceived to exist, e.g., armed persons or known criminals on site, threatening civil disturbances exist, etc. * An emergency evacuation of plant exists or a perceived possibility of an internal theft attempt exists. * An adversary penetration of plant is imminent, in progress, or exists. 4.0 SAS'S CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES 4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT THE CAS: * Receives or learns of an explicit threat against the plant, * Infers that a threat exists from a civil disturbance or because of observed anomalies or other suspicious situations, or * Is informed that a serious threat exists by REP Plant MGMT or other authority, THE SAS WILL: a. Report all information about the perceived threat without delay to the Security Officer and keep REP Plant MGMT informed as applicable. b. Contact local police and other sources as necessary to monitor the status of civil disturbances and pertinent offsite suspicious activity of concern to REP Plant security. c. Implement additional security surveillance of REP Plant and CAS as directed by the Security Officer, e.g., * Brief On-Duty and Off-Duty Guards and RESPN Team elements concerning the threat and readiness preparations, * Place Off-Duty Guard on standby alert, and * Reinforce the CAS, the RESPN Team, and the patrol security of REP Plant. 4.2 IN THE EVENT THAT THE SAS: * Receives an indication of a possible plant penetration, such as: - Annunciation of the silent alarm from the CAS, or otherwise reported by the CAS, - Annunciation of plant alarms without followup information from the CAS, - Suspicious acts or noises reported in or near the plant or on site, or - Civil disturbance or other suspicious situation on site, or being directed at the site. THE SAS WILL: a. Marshall and dispatch the RESPN Team to investigate and report on the situation. b. As applicable, alert the CAS and the Security Officer about the situation and keep them informed of investigative results. c. Monitor and assess the situation to determine if there is danger of an attempted plant penetration. d. If an attempted plant penetration is perceived or appears to be imminent, * Commit the RESPN Team to stop or to delay the adversary, depending upon the relative situation of the adversary and the RESPN Team. * Request assistance of the LEA response force if it has not been requested already by the CAS or if the perceived adversary is still off site or is on site but not yet at the plant's exclusion area. * During its deployment to the site, keep the LEA response force informed of the site security and adversary situations and other information as directed by the Security Officer. * Alert, marshall, brief, and assist in the deployment of the Off-Duty Guards as directed by the Security Officer. * Alert and keep Site MGMT informed of the situation. * Prevent penetration of the SAS by the adversary. e. If the plant is seized and held hostage by the adversary, monitor the situation and: * Brief and deploy the RESPN Team and the marshalled Off-Duty Guards as directed by the Security Officer to assist onsite LEA maintain surveillance of the plant's protected area and isolation of the plant from unauthorized traffic and persons. * Keep the Security Force, REP Plant MGMT, and Site MGMT informed of the situation to enhance effective coordination of the activities supporting negotiation efforts and preventing adversary escape with SNM. f. If the adversary penetrates the plant and escapes, * Immediately report information on the escape situation to the LEA, i.e., - Egress route and last seen direction of movement, - Transport description and license number(s), - Number of persons involved and descriptions, - Description of articles carried by adversary on departure, and - Location of adversary and cargo in the transport. * Request the LEA to execute road blocks and hot pursuit operations to apprehend the adversary for recovery of any missing SNM. g. Assist in conducting after-action interviews of the Security Force as directed by the Security Officer. 4.3 IN THE EVENT THE SAS: * Learns of a possible internal attempt to steal SNM or to sabotage the plant, e.g., - Attempt is reported from CAS, REP Plant MGMT, or the Security Officer, - Intrusion alarm, door alarm, or MAA portal alarm annunciates, - An emergency evacuation or other type disturbance (fight, irrational behavior, etc.) occurs in the plant, or - An unexpected power outage, communication outage, or other safeguards degrading incident occurs, THE SAS WILL: a. Alert and dispatch RESPN Team if warranted by the situation to: * Investigate and report on alarm situations and take action as required to prevent an internal adversary's (1) escape with SNM or (2) sabotage of the plant. * Observe evacuations of the plant buildings for any suspicious activity (e.g., obvious security breaches, attempted hiding or passage of items in the protected area, attempted exit via protective fences, etc.) and report and investigate any such activity. b. Dispatch guard assistance when requested by REP Plant MGMT to assist in dealing with internal disturbances. c. Marshall Off-Duty Guards and request LEA assistance as directed by the Security Officer. d. Brief and deploy the security force as directed by the Security Officer to compensate for degraded plant safeguards capability. 4.4 IN THE EVENT THAT THE SAS IS INFORMED OF: * Physical evidence suggesting that a previously undetected intrusion of the plant might have occurred, e.g.: - Hole in the perimeter fence, a plant wall, or the roof - Damaged plant doors or windows, or * Damage that results in radioactive contamination external to plant, THE SAS WILL: a. Coordinate with CAS, Security Officer, and REP Plant MGMT as necessary to obtain information on radiological hazard areas; keep guard force informed of such areas. b. Dispatch RESPN Team to inspect the plant area for damaged protective fences and buildings and to recommend security arrangements required to restore adequate protection; keep Security Officer and REP Plant MGMT informed of such information. c. Marshall and deploy Off-Duty Guards and RESPN Team elements as directed by the Security Officer to secure damaged plant areas and to isolate hazardous radioactive areas. Enclosure 4 Appendix F RESPN TEAM'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY 1. PURPOSE This document summarizes the general responsibilities and contingency task sequences normally accomplished by the RESPN Team. The context and background perspective of these duties are presented in the basic plan. 2. RESPN TEAM'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES The RESPN Team will accomplish general responsibilities listed below in coordination with CAS and SAS. SAS will keep the Site Security Officer informed of RESPN Team actions as appropriate to the situation. a. Be prepared to arm, to communicate, and to respond immediately when alerted and to summon LEA response force as dictated by the situation. b. Intercept, assess, report, and deal with perceived adversary incursions against REP Plant until effective LEA arrival in order to prevent theft or plant sabotage. c. Monitor and report on pertinent civil disturbances and other suspicious situations to assist in assessing their danger to REP Plant. d. Secure and protect damaged plant areas or plant areas with degraded safeguards capability, as directed by the Security Officer. 3. STANDARD PROCEDURES a. REP Plant MGMT directs the overall response actions of REP Plant personnel in coordination with the Security Officer. b. The Security Officer coordinates with the CAS and the SAS to assume control of security force response operations as soon as practical during the initial response period of a contingency situation. c. The CAS coordinates initial security force response actions directed at the REP Plant's protected area until control is assumed by the Security Officer. * Deploy the RESPN Team to apprehend, stop, or delay the adversary, depending upon the adversary's relative strength and dispositions and the need for protective cover and concealment for the RESPN Team. * Conduct operations as necessary to apprehend, stop, or delay the adversary until the LEA response force arrives. * Keep the Security Officer (SAS) informed of the situation and request reinforcements as dictated by the situation. e. If the plant is seized and held hostage by the adversary, accomplish deployments and security measures as directed by the Security Officer (SAS) to prevent adversary escape with SNM; continue to observe and report the situation. f. If the adversary penetrates the plant and escapes, immediately notify the Security Officer (SAS) of the observed escape situation, i.e., * Egress routes and last seen direction of movement, * Transport description and license number(s), * Number of persons involved and descriptions, * Description of articles carried on departure, and * Location of adversary and cargo in the transport. g. Accomplish deployments and security measures as directed by the Security Officer (SAS) to restore or maintain protection of the plant. h. Accomplish tasks in paragraph 4.3 below if plant damage or dispersed radioactivity exists, or if physical evidence is reported which suggests that a previously undetected intrusion might have occurred. 4.3 IN THE EVENT THAT THE RESPN TEAM IS INFORMED OF OR OBSERVES: * Physical evidence suggesting that a previously undetected intrusion of the plant might have occurred, e.g., - Hole in the perimeter fence, a plant wall, the roof, - Damaged plant doors or windows, or - Damage that results in radioactive contamination external to plant, THE RESPN TEAM WILL: a. Report location and nature of the damage or physical evidence to the Security Officer (SAS) and provide additional security as directed. b. Isolate hazardous radioactive areas. 4.4 IN THE EVENT THAT THE RESPN TEAM: * Is alerted by the CAS or REP Plant MGMT of a possible internal attempt to steal SNM or to sabotage the plant, such as: - Internal intrusion alarms, door alarms, or MAA portal alarms annunciate, - An emergency evacuation or other type of disturbance (fight, irrational behavior, etc.) occurs in the plant, or - An unexpected power outage, communication outage, or other safeguards degrading incident occurs, THE RESPN TEAM WILL: a. Deploy to the scene as directed by the CAS or Security Officer and investigate situation. b. Report on-scene situation to CAS and Security Officer. c. Lock doors and reset alarm system in coordination with REP Plant MGMT. d. Provide additional security as directed by CAS and Security Officer. e. Apprehend individuals attempting sabotage of REP Plant or unauthorized removal of SNM from REP Plant. Enclosure 5 Appendix F OFF-DUTY GUARDS' PROCEDURES SUMMARY 1. PURPOSE This document summarizes the general responsibilities and contingency task sequencies normally accomplished by the Off-Duty Guards. The context and background perspective of these duties are presented in the basic plan. 2. OFF-DUTY GUARDS' GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES The Off-Duty Guards will accomplish general responsibilities listed below in coordination with SAS: a. Be prepared to execute alert procedures and assemble when directed by SAS. b. Reinforce the CAS or REP Plant security as applicable. 3. STANDARD PROCEDURES a. REP Plant MGMT directs the overall response actions of REP Plant personnel in coordination with the Security Officer. b. The Security Officer coordinates with the CAS and the SAS to assume control of security force response operations as soon as practical during the initial response period of a contingency situation. c. The CAS coordinates initial security force response actions directed at the REP Plant's protected area until control is assumed by the Security Officer. d. The SAS coordinates initial security force response actions directed at site locations other than the REP plant's protected area until control is assumed by the Security Officer. e. Coordination of security force operations with police response force operations will be accomplished through the Security Officer to the senior Red Town Police official present. Red Town Police coordinate overall police response operations. f. The CAS operates continually in the Site Radio Comm Net to serve as the net base station for control of the net. g. Site security force operational elements enter and operate in the Site Radio Comm Net from receipt of a contingency alert until the Security Officer terminates the alert. h. As required by the situation, operational elements alert and pass information to each other by the fastest available means, i.e., radio, telephone, intercom, silent alarms, messenger, voice. i. All operational elements report the situation for purposes of operational coordination by observing and reporting on: * Adversary strength, description, dispositions, and activities. * Onsite dispositions and activity opposing the adversary situation. j. The CAS maintains Building 10 locked and allows no person to pass unless specifically authorized by the REP Plant MGMT or the Security Officer whenever: * An unresolved CAS alarm situation exists. * A threatening situation is perceived to exist, e.g., armed persons or known criminals on site, threatening civil disturbances exist, etc. * An emergency evacuation of plant exists or a perceived possibility of an internal theft attempt exists. * An adversary penetration of plant is imminent, in progress, or exists. 4. OFF-DUTY GUARDS' CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES 4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT THE OFF-DUTY GUARDS ARE PLACED ON ALERT STATUS BY THE SECURITY OFFICER (SAS): THE OFF-DUTY GUARDS WILL: a. Assemble at the designated point as soon as possible and be prepared to accomplish guard security functions. b. Accomplish and maintain security deployments and duties as directed by the Security Officer or SAS. Enclosure 6 Appendix F SITE MANAGEMENT'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY 1. PURPOSE This document summarizes the general responsibilities and contingency task sequences normally accomplished by the Site MGMT. The context and background perspective of these duties are presented in the basic plan. 2. SITE MGMT'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES Site MGMT will accomplish general responsibilities listed below in coordination with Security Officer (SAS) and REP Plant MGMT: a. Monitor on-going situation. b. Provide emergency supporting services. c. Execute site emergency plans as indicated by the situation. 3. STANDARD PROCEDURES a. REP Plant MGMT directs the overall response actions of REP Plant personnel in coordination with the Security Officer. b. The Security Officer coordinates with the CAS and the SAS to assume control of security force response operations as soon as practical during the initial response period of a contingency situation. c. The CAS coordinates initial security force response actions directed at the REP Plant's protected area until control is assumed by the Security Officer. d. The SAS coordinates initial security force response actions directed at site locations other than the REP plant's protected area until control is assumed by the Security Officer. e. Coordination of security force operations with police response force operations will be accomplished through the Security Officer to the senior Red Town Police official present. Red Town Police coordinate overall police response operations. f. The CAS operates continually in the Site Radio Comm Net to serve as the net base station for control of the net. g. Site security force operational elements enter and operate in the Site Radio Comm Net from receipt of a contingency alert until the Security Officer terminates the alert. h. As required by the situation, operational elements alert and pass information to each other by the fastest available means, i.e., radio, telephone, intercom, silent alarms, messenger, voice. i. All operational elements report the situation for purposes of operational coordination by observing and reporting on: * Adversary strength, description, dispositions, and activities. * Onsite dispositions and activity opposing the adversary situation. j. The CAS maintains Building 10 locked and allows no person to pass unless specifically authorized by the REP Plant MGMT or the Security Officer whenever: * An unresolved CAS alarm situation exists. * A threatening situation is perceived to exist, e.g., armed persons or known criminals on site; threatening civil disturbances exist. * An emergency evacuation of plant exists or a perceived possibility of an internal theft attempt exists. * An adversary penetration of plant is imminent, in progress, or exists. 4.0 SITE MGM'S CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES: 4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT THE SITE MGMT RECEIVES OR LEARNS OF AN EXPLICIT THREAT AGAINST THE PLANT, THE SITE MGMT WILL: Report all information about the perceived threat without delay to the Security Officer and REP Plant MGMT. 4.2 IN THE EVENT THAT THE SITE MGMT IS INFORMED: * That a serious threat against the plant exists or * That an emergency evacuation of the plant occurs, THE SITE MGMT WILL: Be prepared to provide emergency supporting services when requested by REP Plant MGMT and to execute site emergency plans when required by the situation. 4.3 IN THE EVENT THAT SITE MGMT LEARNS THAT A PLANT PENETRATION IS IN PROGRESS OR IS PERCEIVED AS IMMINENT, THE SITE MGMT WILL: a. Establish and maintain liaison with REP Plant MGMT to keep appraised of the situation. b. Provide emergency supporting services and execute site emergency plans as warranted by the situation. c. If the plant is penetrated and held hostage, be prepared to accomplish REP Plant MGMT actions in the event REP Plant MGMT is unavailable due to hostage situation. Enclosure 7 Appendix F REP PLANT MGMT'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY 1. PURPOSE This document summarizes the general responsibilities and listed below in coordination with Site MGMT, NRC, and local, county, and State police: 2. REP PLANT'S MGMT'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES REP Plant MGMT will accomplish general responsibilities listed below in coordination with Site MGMT, NRC, and local, county, and State police: a. Assess threats made against REP Plant to determine their seriousness. b. Increase security readiness as appropriate to prevent theft of SNM or sabotage at REP Plant whenever threatened adversary incursions are serious. c. Monitor and assess incursion situations and direct security and REP Plant operations as necessary to prevent theft of SNM or sabotage. d. Conduct extra SNM inventories and other MCA operations indicated by the situation to assess theft or diversion possibilities or to determine if SNM is missing. 3. STANDARD PROCEDURES a. REP Plant MGMT directs the overall response actions of REP Plant personnel in coordination with the Security Officer. b. The Security Officer coordinates with the CAS and the SAS to assume control of security force response operations as soon as practical during the initial response period of a contingency situation. c. The CAS coordinates initial security force response actions directed at site locations other than the REP Plant's protected area until control is assumed by the Security Officer. d. The SAS coordinates initial security force response actions directed at site locations other than the REP Plant's protected area until control is assumed by the Security Officer. e. Coordination of security force operations with police response force operations will be accomplished through the Security Officer to the senior Red Town Police official present. Red Town Police coordinate overall police response operations. f. The CAS operates continually in the Site Radio Comm Net to serve as the net base station for control of the net. g. Site security force operational elements enter and operate in the Site Radio Comm Net from receipt of a contingency alert until the Security Officer terminates the alert. h. As required by the situation, operational elements alert and pass information to each other by the fastest available means, i.e., radio, telephone, intercom, silent alarms, messenger, voice. i. All operational elements report the situation for purposes of operational coordination by observing and reporting on: * Adversary strength, description, dispositions, and activities. * Onsite dispositions and activity opposing the adversary situation. j. The CAS maintains Building 10 locked and allows no person to pass unless specifically authorized by the REP Plant MGMT or the Security Officer whenever: * An unresolved CAS alarm situation exists. * A threatening situation is perceived to exist, e.g., armed persons or known criminals on site, threatening civil disturbances exist, etc. * An emergency evacuation of plant exists or a perceived possibility of an internal theft attempt exists. * An adversary penetration of plant is imminent, in progress, or exists. 4. REP PLANT MGMT'S CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES 4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT REP PLANT MGMT: * Receives or learns of an explicit threat against the plant, * Infers that a threat exists from a civil disturbance or because of observed anomalies or other suspicious situations at the plant, or * Is informed that a serious threat exists by duly constituted authority, THE REP PLANT MGMT WILL: a. Have the Security Officer arrange monitoring of the civil disturbance or suspicious situation to assess the extent of danger to the plant, as applicable. b. Assemble available information on threat and adversary. c. Report threat to NRC, to company headquarters, and to law enforcement agencies as applicable and request any pertinent information that may be available. d. Assess available information to determine if threat is serious; if threat is perceived serious or determined serious by duly constituted authority, - Report assessment to NRC, to company headquarters, and to Site MGMT. - Coordinate with company headquarters and Site MGMT as appropriate to inform local, county, and State law enforcement of threat and to request assistance. - Direct increased plant security appropriate to situation via Security Officer. - Monitor on-going situation and be prepared to take further actions as necessary. 4.2 IN THE EVENT THAT REP PLANT MGMT: * Is requested by duly constituted authority to perform an item count inventory in relation to a threat posed elsewhere, THE REP PLANT MGMT WILL: a. Direct the conduct of the item count inventory and b. Report results to NRC. 4.3 IN THE EVENT THAT THE REP PLANT MGMT: * Receives a report from the Security Officer, CAS, or SAS or otherwise learns of an imminent or ongoing attempt by an adversary or civil disturbance to penetrate the plant, THE REP PLANT MGMT WILL: a. Depending upon situation, direct evacuation of plant personnel from plant area or assemble personnel into the protection of central rooms in plant area. b. In coordination with Security Officer, continue monitoring and assessment of on-going situation; direct additional security measures as required by situation. c. Report situation to NRC. d. If plant is seized and held hostage, * Report situation to Security Officer, police authorities, and NRC as appropriate. * Establish communications with adversary and direct negotiations until police arrive. * As required by police situation, request NRC arrange Federal assistance from FBI to negotiate plant's release and adversary surrender. * Assist police and FBI; as applicable, negotiate with adversary. e. If adversary escapes, * As appropriate to situation, monitor and report escape situation to Security Officer and police authorities; request offsite apprehension. * Direct radiological survey of plant damage. * Coordinate with Security Officer to deploy guard force for protection of uncovered plant exclusion area. * Conduct inventory and accounting of SNM. * Conduct interviews of guards and plant employees to determine if SNM theft was observed. * Assemble and assess information to estimate quantity/type SNM stolen and radioactivity dispersed. * Report situation and status of SNM and dispersal to NRC. 4.4 IN THE EVENT THAT THE REP PLANT MGMT: * Learns of a possible internal attempt to steal SNM or to sabotage the plant, such as: - Internal intrusion alarms, door alarms, or MAA portal alarms annuciate, - An emergency evacuation or other type of disturbance (fight, irrational behavior, etc.) occurs in the plant, or - An unexpected power outage, communication outage, or other safeguards degrading incident occurs, * Observes or is informed of physical evidence suggesting that a previously undetected intrusion of the plant might have occurred, such as, - Hole in perimeter fence, a plant wall, the roof, - Damaged plant doors or windows, THE REP PLANT MGMT WILL: a. Coordinate with the Security Officer as necessary to determine the circumstances of the incident and the present status and activity of the security force; request law enforcement and immediate guard assistance as indicated by the situation. b. Assemble and assess available information on the incident to determine if it is associated with an attempted theft or sabotage. c. Direct additional security measures and plant actions as required by the situation, e.g., - Restore safeguards and security for plant exclusion area, MAA, and VA, - Search Plant exclusion and contiguous areas for diverted SNM, - Conduct inventory and accounting of SNM, and - Assess circumstances of situation to assist law enforcement investigators to identify and apprehend adversary. d. As warranted, report situation and status of SNM and dispersal to NRC. 4.5 IN THE EVENT THAT REP PLANT MGMT: * Is aware of plant damage that results in radioactive contamination, THE REP PLANT MGMT WILL: a. Assemble information and assess damage, security deficiencies, and radiological hazard. b. Commence radiological safety emergency plan procedures as applicable. c. Secure the plant and restore safeguards to MAA and exclusion areas. d. Establish priorities for temporary and permanent repairs to plant and security systems. e. Report situation to NRC. 4.6 IN THE EVENT THAT REP PLANT MGMT: * Learns that material control and accounting records have been damaged, destroyed, altered or are missing, or * Is advised that the material control and accounting system indicates a possible theft of SNM, THE REP PLANT MGMT WILL: a. Report situation to NRC. b. Assemble and assess information on damage, destruction, or discrepancies pertaining to MCA records. c. Reconstruct records if applicable. d. Direct audit and inventory as necessary to locate possible erroneous data from previous inventory actions. e. Resolve differences between inventory data and record data. f. If SNM is unaccounted for, report type and quantity missing to NRC. Enclosure 8 Appendix F ADMIN, MAA, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY 1. PURPOSE This document summarizes the general responsibilities and contingency task sequences normally accomplished by the ADMIN, MAA, and BLDG 7 personnel. The context and background perspective of these duties are presented in the basic plan. 2. ADMIN, MAA, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES ADMIN, MAA, BLDG 7 personnel will accomplish general responsibilities listed below in coordination with REP Plant MGMT. a. Upon receiving alert of a possible adversary incursion, immediately lock doors to MAA and VA, as applicable, to protect against possible SNM theft or sabotage, and be prepared to assemble or to evacuate as directed by REP Plant MGMT. b. Observe for and report information on adversary activities or suspicious events to REP Plant MGMT to assist in assessment of the on-going situation, and to detect attempts to steal or divert SNM or to sabotage. d. Assist in conducting SNM inventories and other operations as directed by REP Plant MGMT to assess possibilities of theft or to determine if SNM is missing. d. Report damaged or unprotected areas in REP Plant buildings, and provide protection to restore security as directed by REP Plant MGMT. 3. STANDARD PROCEDURES a. REP Plant MGMT directs the overall repsonse actions of REP Plant personnel in coordination with the Security Officer. b. The Security Officer coordinates with the CAS and the SAS to assume control of security force response operations as soon as practical during the initial response period of a contingency situation. c. The CAS coordinates initial security force response actions directed at the REP Plant's protected area until control is assumed by the Security Officer. d. The SAS coordinates initial security force response actions directed at site locations other than the REP Plant's protected area until control is assumed by the Security Officer. e. Coordination of security force operations with police response force operations will be accomplished through the Security Officer to the senior Red Town Police official present. Red Town Police coordinate overall police response operations. f. The CAS operates continually in the Site Radio Comm Net to serve as the net base station for control of the net. g. Site security force operational elements enter and operate in the Site Radio Comm Net from receipt of a contingency alert until the Security Officer terminates the alert. h. As required by the situation, operational elements alert and pass information to each other by the fastest available means, i.e., radio, telephone, intercom, silent alarms, messenger, voice. i. All operational elements report the situation for purposes of operational coordination by observing and reporting on: * Adversary strength, description, dispositions, and activities and * Onsite dispositions and activity opposing the adversary situation. j. The CAS maintains Building 10 locked and allows no person to pass unless specifically authorized by the REP Plant MGMT or the Security Officer whenever: * An unresolved CAS alarm situation exists. * A threatening situation is perceived to exist, e.g., armed persons or known criminals on site, threatening civil disturbances exist, etc. * An emergency evacuation of plant exists or a perceived possibility of an internal theft attempt exists. * An adversary penetration of plant is imminent, in progress, or exists. 4. ADMIN, MAA, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL'S CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES 4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT ADMIN, MAA, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL: * Receive or learns of an explicit threat against the plant, * Are informed by the SAS or Security Officer that a civil disturbance or other suspicious situation might constitute a threat against the plant, or * Learn from the Security Officer or other authority that a serious threat actually exists against the plant, THE ADMIN, MAA, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL WILL: a. Report to REP Plant MGMT and Security Officer without delay all threat information or knowledge of civil disturbances and other suspicious events. b. Perform additional security surveillance of plant as directed by REP Plant MGMT. c. Be prepared to assist in securing REP Plant MAA, vital areas, and building when alerted. 4.2 IN THE EVENT THE ADMIN, MAA, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL: * Observe or are informed that a plant penetration is in progress or is perceived imminent, THE ADMIN, MAA, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL WILL: a. When alerted, immediately lock alarmed doors that might happen to be open. b. Execute evaucation or assembly as directed by REP Plant MGMT. c. If the plant is seized and held hostage by the adversary, * Keep alarmed doors locked as applicable. * Evacuate REP Plant employees as directed by REP Plant MGMT. * Communicate with adversary only as directed by REP Plant MGMT. d. If the adversary penetrates the plant and escapes, * Report to REP Plant MGMT any observed plant damage or likely radiological hazards caused by the adversary. * Execute pertinent radiological emergency plans as directed by REP Plant MGMT. * Secure MAA and VA in accordance with REP Plant procedures. * Report any observed SNM theft by adversary to REP Plant MGMT. * Assist in conduct of SNM inventory in accordance with REP Plant procedure. 4.3 IN THE EVENT THAT ADMIN, MAA, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL: * Learn of a possible internal attempt to steal SNM or to sabotage the plant, e.g., - Material control and accounting records are damaged, destroyed, altered, missing or the accounting and control system indicates a possible theft, - CAS, REP Plant MGMT, or the Security Officer reports, - Intrusion alarm, door alarm, or MAA portal alarm annunciates, - An emergency evacuation or other type disturbance (fight, irrational behavior, etc.) occurs in the plant, - An emergency power outage, communication outage, or other safeguards degrading incident occurs, * Learn of physical evidence suggesting that a previously undetected intrusion of the plant might have occurred, e.g., - Hole in the perimeter fence, a plant wall, the roof or - Damaged plant doors or windows, THE ADMIN, MAA, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL WILL: a. As applicable, report to REP Plant MGMT any observed security breaches or suspicious activity, particularly regarding attempts to hide items or to pass items outside the perimeter fence. b. Assist in the assessment of the situation and restoration of safeguards and services as directed by REP Plant MGMT. c. Assist in search of REP Plant area for diverted SNM and for evidence of sabotage as directed by REP Plant MGMT. d. Assist accomplishment of inventory actions as directed by REP Plant MGMT. 4.4 IN THE EVENT THAT ADMIN, MAA, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL ARE INFORMED OF: * Damage that results in radioactive contamination, THE ADMIN, MAA, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL WILL: a. Execute pertinent radiological safety emergency plans. b. Post watchman as required to secure MAA and VA and coordinate with Security Officer to obtain desired guard support. c. Report damage and physical security deficiencies to REP Plant MGMT. Enclosure 9 Appendix F LEA'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY 1. PURPOSE This document summarizes the general responsibilities and task sequences that are requested of the pertinent LEA in the planned contingency situations. The context and background perspective of these actions are presented in the basic plan. 2. LEA'S GENERAL FUNCTIONS The LEA have an overall responsibility to maintain law and order within their respective jurisdictional areas. With their available resources they endeavor to prevent illegal activities, solve crimes, and apprehend law breakers. Within the context of their law enforcement responsibilities, applicable LEA, in the near vicinity of NRC licensed facilities requiring Part 73 physical protection, have been requested to perform the functions listed below in response to contingency situations. a. Provide investigative assistance to check on a suspicious situation. b. Provide a response force to deal with unlawful adversary actions against nuclear facilities within their jurisdiction. c. Provide traffic control and area isolation (cordon) as required by the situation. 3. STANDARD PROCEDURES Red Town Police have been requested to: a. Be prepared to respond as soon as possible to a request for law enforcement assistance from the plant. b. Marshall and coordinate assistance from other law enforcement jurisdictions as required to deal with unlawful incursions against the plant. c. Report any available information to the REP Plant MGMT, NRC, and the FBI that is indicative of possible danger to the plant or personnel. d. Coordinate law enforcement plans and response operations with the Security Officer. 4. LEA'S TASK SEQUENCES 4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT LEA ASSISTANCE IS REQUESTED REGARDING: * An explicit threat against the plant, * A civil disturbance or other suspicious situation that might constitute a threat against the plant, or * A serious threat that is believed to exist against the plant, THE LEA CAN BE EXPECTED TO: a. Provide any available information relative to the situation. b. Assist REP Plant MGMT in assessment of the threat as requested. 4.2 IN THE EVENT THAT LEA: * Is advised of an event that requires temporary changes in LEA response plans, e.g., - Blocked LLEA route to site, - Communication outages, THE LEA CAN BE EXPECTED TO: a. Coordinate with the Security Officer. b. Modify their plans for assistance as appropriate. 4.3 IN THE EVENT THAT LEA ASSISTANCE IS REQUESTED REGARDING: * A plant penetration that is in progress or is perceived as imminent, THE LEA CAN BE EXPECTED TO: a. Request additional police assistance as warranted by the situation. b. Assemble a police force without delay at the plant site. c. Coordinate with the Security Officer to obtain situation information needed for effective direction of LEA resource operations. d. Establish offsite road blocks as required by situation. e. Execute police plans to apprehend adversaries. f. If the plant is seized and held hostage by the adversary, * Execute police plans to negotiate release of plant and hostages and the surrender of the adversary. * Establish and maintain road blocks on site and off site and other deployments as required to ensure capture of adversary if an escape is attempted. g. If escape from plant is underway, * Pursue and apprehend adversaries in coordination with State and county police authorities. * Assist FBI investigation to recover any stolen SNM. 4.4 IN THE EVENT THAT LEA ASSISTANCE IS REQUESTED REGARDING: * Sabotage that has resulted in dispersal of radioactivity, THE LEA CAN BE EXPECTED TO: Assist in isolation of radiological hazards area by providing traffic and crowd control as necessary. 52